We consider fuzzy, or continuous, bits, which take values in [0; 1] and (−1; 1] instead of {0; 1}, and operations on them (NOT, XOR etc.) and on their sequences (ADD), to obtain the generalization of cryptographic hash functions, CHFs, for the messages consisting of fuzzy bits, so that CHFs become smooth and non-constant functions of each bit of the message. We then train the neural networks to predict the message that has a given hash, where the loss function for the hash of predicted message and given true hash is backpropagatable. The results of the trainings for the standard CHFs -MD5, SHA1, SHA2-256, and SHA3/Keccak -with small number of (optionally weakened) rounds are presented and compared.
Introduction
Mermaids are boring to fishes from below and to humans from above...
One of the main requirements for a cryptographic hash function (CHF) is the preimage resistance ( [16, 5.1] ): for the known message/bit string M = (m 1 ; ...; m r ) it is "easy" to calculate the hash H = h(M ) = (h 1 ; ...; h k ), but for the known H and the unknown M it is "hard" to obtain any M = (m 1 ; ...; m s ) such that h(M ) = h(M ). In other words, the calculation of the inverse function h −1 (H) (that is, to find any element from the preimage of H with respect to h) requires, in average, "too much" computation, even though h is not injective for s > k. The worst case is when only the exhaustive search guarantees the obtaining of M , which takes time being proportional on the average to 2 k (if not applying quantum computers, [3] ).
In due course many methods, or attacks, were proposed and developed to reduce the average time needed to invert the specific CHF: see [29] for MD5, [6] for SHA1, [2] for SHA2, [23] for SHA3/Keccak. These attacks usually come after "easier" collision attacks (see [22] , [30] , [31] , [33] ), which require in average 2 k/2 attempts in the worst case. From the practical side, for instance, there are widely used SAT(isfiability) solvers ( [7] , [10] , [23] , [24] ). These approaches work with discrete, binary as a rule, variables, they search for the combinations of these variables that satisfy certain equations using various techniques to speed up the search.
(Artificial) neural networks (NNs) on their own are generally considered to be ineffective, -or, to put it stronger, absolutely useless, -for CHF inversion due to discreteness of the arguments and the values of CHFs, as well as of inverse CHFs. See e.g. [37] , [38] , [44] . Here's why:
Let the input of NN be H = h(M ), and we try to train NN to predict M such that h(M ) = H (M = M isn't necessary). For the predicted message M we calculate H = h(M ) and compare it with H, obtaining the value of the loss function, which generally decreases when H "becomes closer" to H, and increases otherwise. For the learning/optimization algorithms, based on gradient descent (GD) and back propagation (BP) ( [11, 4.3, 5.9, 6 .5], [28] ), to work, the loss function must satisfy certain properties; in particular, it has to be smooth enough and non-constant (though some special, less restrictive types of the optimization and GD have been developed).
Clearly, if we use CHFs defined as they are for bit strings, the outputs of (the last layer of) NN should be discretized to 0 or 1 before we can calculate the CHF of predicted message; here we cannot treat the outputs as probabilities like we do for classification or pattern recognition problems. Regardless of how we perform the discretization, the loss function will be piecewiseconstant and non-continuous, because both hashes are discrete then. Even if we replace it with piecewise-linear one, or something smoother, the dependency of the loss on the weights will be greatly reduced. However many samples we take and average on them, the loss remains discrete, hence the small change of any weight either leaves it the same, or makes it leap. Now, if we extend the definition of CHF to the bits from the whole [0; 1], so that it becomes smooth, non-constant, and more dependable on each bit of the message, then these obstacles to GD and BP will be removed. Of course, other issues appear, -local minima; rounding errors of the floating point arithmetic; NN may learn to predict "essentially fuzzy" messages for given usual hashes, such messages when rounded to usual bits change hashes, -but at least NN will be able to learn. And if the learning were "successful", then trained NN, perhaps with assistance of other methods, would invert the CHF without trying a lot of combinations of binary variables.
Such bits are the well-known generalization of usual ones, they are called fuzzy and are the basis of fuzzy logic (see e.g. [13] , [17, III] , [35] ). However, we do not need to keep all "logical" properties, because they may "stick" us to the extension that is not suitable for our task. Moreover, we can extend the bit domain even further, from [0; 1] to (−1; 1].
Although we do not rely on logical or probabilistic interpretation of the bit value, cf. [9, XII] . Perhaps here it would be better to call such bits continuous (see [8, 3.2] ).
The task for NN then is rather an approximation than a pattern recognition. To be precise, we can train NN in two different ways, to be either a) general inverter : at the training NN is presented with hashes of many random messages. After the training NN should be able to invert arbitrary hash, not only those it saw at the training (at least partially). Here NN becomes the approximator of the whole inverse CHF; or b) single inverter : at the training phase we repeatedly input the one and the same hash into NN, which attempts to predict the message whose hash is as "close" to the input as possible. When the training is finished, NN should invert only this hash (again, partially). Here NN is the optimizer of the "distance" between the hash of its output and the fixed input hash. In principle, such NN doesn't have to be a "network" and may consist of the output layer only (however, we found that letting such NN know the input hash seems to improve the accuracy of inversion).
(a) is more universal, (b) is simpler.
Disclaimer. Because of the small, if any, accuracy of such inversion for a substantial number of CHFs' rounds and message length, as shown in the Results, we do not consider it to be an "attack" or to have any practical cryptanalytic value (e.g. it does not at all help to mine cryptocurrencies), at least on its own. There may exist theorems, unknown to us, proving that under certain conditions NNs cannot invert better/faster than discrete methods. Rather it is the analysis of inverse CHFs from the approximation by composition of elementary functions point of view, or perhaps a mere "proof-of-concept" to make the aforementioned absolute uselessness doubtful.
We suppose that similar investigations were done before, in multiple places, probably some of their outcomes were not published due to various reasons. We were able to find the researches on resemblant themes, gathered under Neural Crypto-graphy/-analysis name, the closest ones being the CryptoNet from [8, 3.2] and the descriptions from [9, XII] (presumably, there are others we'll be glad to know about). Many works are dedicated to the construction of CHF on the basis of NN, when the NN input is a message, and the output is a hash, among the others see [12, 7] , [21] , [32] ; such CHFs are cryptanalyzed e.g. in [26] ; in [1] NNs assist in known-plaintext attack on DES; in [15] the key exchange protocol is proposed, and analyzed in [19] , based on synchronization of 2 NNs; in [34] NNs are used in conjunction with homomorphic encryption. See also [20] , [27] , [36] .
1 Bits, hashes, and neural networks the ops on such bits can be generalized in many ways, accordingly to the properties we try to keep. Even when the goal is to build a "natural fuzzy logic" (which we do not aim at), it can be done differently; see [13, 2] . We describe some of these generalizations below and select one for each op. Fuzzy ops are denoted in the same way as the usual ones. There are 4 basic ops: NOT, AND, OR, XOR. We define each of them for a pair of bits, then extend to the bit strings of equal length bitwisely: if the op on bits a and b is a * b, then (a 1 ; ...; a n ) * (b 1 ; ...; b n ) := (a 1 * b 1 ; ...; a n * b n ).
1)
Consistency: for binbits the result of the fuzzy op will be equal to that of the usual op (then any composition of the fuzzy ops has this property too): 3) Feedback: the ops must be smooth enough w.r.t. the operands, and they must not block the back propagation.
Some, but not all, algebraic and "logical" properties will remain (see below). We cannot say for sure if keeping or losing certain property of this kind, or a subset of properties, makes NN training easier or harder. Also, for binbits all these properties are kept due to 1st requirement.
NOT. NOT(a) := 1 − a is less ambiguous than other ops, though alternatives exist:
AND. a AND b := ab called product t-norm. Alternatives are a AND 1 b = min{a, b} (the "traditional" one, as e.g. in [17] 
Again, the absence of this property doesn't significantly affect the training results.
Alternatives:
, where x (mod y) = x − y x y for x 0, y > 0, although being more natural in some sense, doesn't satisfy 2nd requirement.
ADD. The addition (to be precise, the addition modulo 2 n ) is special: when applied to two bit strings of equal length, it is not reduced to bitwise version like the previous ops, due to carry propagation. This propagation contributes to diffusion, which is an important component of CHF.
Let A = (a 1 ; ...; a n ) and B = (b 1 ; ...; b n ) ("little-endian": the lower bits have lesser indices). We obtain the bits of the result S = (s 1 ; ...; s n ) = A ADD B one by one, starting from s 1 and calculating the digit In usual logical ops:
We use the same expression to define D (since our XOR is associative, it doesn't matter if we take (
; in general case we would have to choose), but represent C from the identity
Thus defined ADD is commutative, but not associative (except for the 1st bit) on fuzbit strings.
Interpolation. Our fuzzy bitwise ops correspond with the following well-known interpolation of the function f : [0; 1] 2 → R inside the [0; 1] 2 square, based on its values at corners:
For D and C we use such interpolation inside the [0; 1] 3 cube.
Modular arithmetic on circle. Another way to fuzzy some ops relies on the domain (−1; 1], viewed as scaled angles of the point on unit circle: a ∈ (−1; 1] maps to cos(πa); sin(πa) ∈ R 2 or to z = e iπa = cos(πa) + i sin(πa) ∈ C. Then, for instance, we define (cf. [8, 3.2] )
where ATANXY(x, y) for x 2 + y 2 = 1 is the angle ϕ ∈ (−π; π] such that cos ϕ = x and sin ϕ = y. In particular, thus defined XOR has more "modular linearity" than the interpolation-based one. The distance between two such fuzbits is angular ρ(a, b) = min{|a − b|, |a − b + 2|, |b − a + 2|} or Euclidean distance between corresponding points on unit circle. At the end of calculations circular fuzbits can be mapped to "standard" fuzbits, a → |a|, -note that this mapping provides another "distance", ρ(a, b) = |a| − |b| , -and then to binbits, by rounding |a|.
We use circular fuzbits and ops, up to NN training, only for SHA3/Keccak (in addition to "standard" fuzbits for it). For other CHFs with ADD op, and for Keccak with long enough messages, they sometimes impede learning: NN learns to predict an "essentially fuzzy" message whose bits are far from 0/1 and thus cannot be rounded to get binbit string with the same hash.
On the other hand, we could add a penalty for the output fuzbits of NN being far from binbits.
Fuzzy hashes
which might be called "hashes of fuzbit strings", because the term "fuzzy hash" has certain established meaning already, and it's different from ours; cf. [25] , [43] . The approach is simply this: take the algorithm to calculate CHF and consider all ops on bits and bit strings as fuzzy. To be precise, we fuzzy only the "change bits" ops and keep untouched the "move bits" ops like left shift SHL/ , right rotation ROR/≫, or any other fixed permutation of bits. In particular, LEBE reverses byte order, switching between little-and big-endian.
Message length in bits is a usual number, hence the padding is done with binbits. The algorithms are described in many places, see [41] , [42] , [46] , [47] , [48] .
For example, the single (i-th for i = 0, 63) SHA2-256 round in pseudocode:
There are modifications that doesn't change the result for binbits, but make it different for fuzbits, e.g. P := (E AND F ) XOR (NOT(E) AND G).
To specify the number of rounds (defaults are 64 for MD5, 80 for SHA1, 64 for SHA2, and 24 for SHA3/Keccak), we add the second argument: SHA1(M , 4) is SHA1 with 4 rounds.
For the ASCII-encoded message M = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog." the hash SHA1(M , 2) is H = c30b13efe3eaa95cf28c25be8c25bf585c8dbeee in hexadecimal bytes. The 6th bit of M (here the count starts from 1) is m 6 = 0, the 32nd bit of H is h 32 = 1. If we change m 6 to 1, then h 32 is still 1. If we change m 6 from 0 to 1 gradually, h 32 is given on (a): −12 already gives h 32 = 0.5. In some sense, it corresponds with "certainty" meaning of a fuzzy bit: when we combine uncertaint entities, the certainty diminishes.
In attempt to circumvent this flaw we can modify fuzzy ops as follows: the result r is transformed smoothly so that r ∈ [0; indicating another potential flaw -an "excessive" non-linearity. Of course, from CHF design's point of view this is a merit, not a flaw.
Neural networks and training
We apply, in general, the traditional fully-connected perceptron: NN is the sequence of the layers, each layer consists of the cells, the output of each cell is the function of the weighted sum of the outputs of all cells from the previous layer:
We extend it with the so-called batch normalization ( [11, 8.7 .1], [14] ) after each inner layer; not only does it accelerate learning, but improves the final results, -the average number of wrong hash bits becomes 1.5-2 times less. Occasionally, regularization techniques (dropout, weight regularization etc.) may be added.
Perhaps more sophisticated (e.g. deeper) architectures will work better, perhaps not.
The hyperparameters of such NN are the number of layers and the number of cells in each layer. The size of the input layer is the size of the hash, the size of the output layer is the size of the predicted message (so any NN of this kind predicts the messages of certain fixed length).
To implement this architecture, we use Keras framework ( [40] ) with TensorFlow backend ( [45] ).
The activation function for all layers except the output one is ELU: a(x) = x, x 0, e x − 1, x 0.
The activation for the output layer is sigmoid a(x) = (1 + e −x ) −1 ∈ (0; 1) or "hard sigmoid" a(x) = min{max{0; The loss function is calculated as follows: let h() be the fuzzy CHF and H = h(M ) for the randomly generated message M . M is unknown to NN, and H is the input to NN. NN predicts fuzzy message M , for which we obtain the fuzzy hash H = h(M ) and the single loss L = L(H; H ). If NN is trained by batches of size n (so there are n input hashes H 1 , ..., H n ), then the total loss on the batch is
(denoted by BCE), which sometimes slightly improves the accuracy of inversion.
The optimizer is Nadam (Nesterov Adam) with default learning rate 0.002, it can be replaced by Adam or RMSprop with no significant impact on the results; see [11, 8.5] , [18] .
Results
are given in Addendum. Each of them consists of 6 items:
1. CHF, number of rounds, message length, and the mask -the bits of hash that contribute to the loss and miss count (regardless of the mask, input to NN is always a full hash).
Hyperparameters of NN (cells in each layer) and training parameters per epoch (train samples and batch size).
3. Training chart: X is epoch, Y is loss.
When the training finishes, we proceed to the testing phase. We randomly generate 1024 binbit messages, calculate the CHF for them and let the trained NN predict the messages with the same hashes. Then we bitwisely round predicted messages so that fuzbits become binbits, calculate their usual hashes and for each pair (true hash; hash of rounded predicted message) count the number of misses -different binbits of hashes. After that we generate another 1024 random messages, calculate their hashes and compare with the true ones to count misses; this shows the advantage of the trained NN over "zero level" of randomly guessing the message with a given hash.
4.
Histograms of total number of misses: X is number of misses, Y is number of hashes with so many misses, for predicted and for random messages.
5. Histogram of misses for hash bits of predicted messages: X is the index of bit, Y is the frequency of miss at this bit.
6. Average, minumum, and maximum number of misses, for predicted and random messages.
Only the ranges with non-zero values are shown.
In this scheme, instead of training NN on the actual values of certain CHF for the messages, we can input random bit strings, including the hashes that are "impossible" (e.g. 1-round SHA1 produces the hash with majority of its bits being constant). As with many other choices, it makes almost no difference: the speed of learning is the same, and although the final loss is greater due to "unreachable" wrong hash bits, in the end NN inverts test hashes equally well/not well.
We present "general inversion" results (see Introduction), because we have found that in average they are usually close to "single inversion" ones. When the task is to invert a specific hash, it is certainly more preferable to train many NNs, each given this hash, and collect "the best" preimages with minimal number of hash bit misses.
In most cases, the loss function at the end of the training has apparently come close to an asymptotic value, but sometimes the training was interrupted before that, and the loss had not yet reached its minimum.
The results are stable: if we run NN training with the same hyperparameters, for the same number of epochs etc., the final loss and the accuracy for the test hashes will be nearly identical.
Conclusion and further development
Obviously, as the number of rounds increases, all four CHFs quickly become too complicated for NNs of considered architectures to invert, or, in other terms, to approximate the inverse function.
SHA1: NN is able to invert 1 round with positive probability, for 2 rounds there are at least 10 misses, then the number of misses becomes greater than the number of matched bits. The full hash for more than 5-6 rounds with the accordingly long messages is almost uninvertible; the quick-convergence-to- MD5: slightly harder than SHA1, but closer to it than to SHA2 from NN-inversion difficulty's point of view.
SHA2: similar to SHA1, harder. SHA3/Keccak: Inversion of 1 round for short (what's short depends on rate and capacity) messages is good, can be exact; of 2 and more is very bad. Weakened rounds move the "barrier" further. Learning may delay for few initial epochs. A small group of hash bits can be matched partially.
Even for relatively small number of rounds this approach in its presented form is much weaker than e.g. those from [10] , [23] , [24] . One of its most important shortcomings is that there is no guarantee to obtain the exact preimage, however much time NN has spent on training. Another drawback is the fixed length of the preimage returned by given NN, though it's possible to train many NNs for different message lengths.
On the other hand, a tiny but statistically significant increase of accuracy in hash bits for NNpredicted messages over that for randomly guessed messages indicates the possibility to "trace back" the hash bits to the message ones, which can be exploited.
Few directions of further development, in no particular order, and not without assumption that something has been done already, somewhere:
• Tune fuzzy ops and NN for this problem by defining ops, selecting activations, loss function, optimizer and its parameters etc. more carefully. Few times throughout this paper we've mentioned some alternatives and that switching between them doesn't improve the final accuracy; however, there may be much better ones that slipped past our attention. Objection: this is a common "belief" when dealing with NNs, but maybe it can be proven that NNs will always have a lower positive bound of the accuracy.
• If the value of m-round CHF provides its full internal state, then we can use NN inversion iteratively to restore the state before the m-th round, then before the (m − 1)-th one, and so on. Objection: multiple rounds may depend on the one and the same part of the input message, like SHA1 after the first 16 rounds; also, the hash may come from a truncated state (SHA3/Keccak).
• Modify NN architecture, add connections between non-adjacent layers, convolutions, recurrency, add combinators/solvers that produce fuzzy bits within NN and are controlled by outputs of the cells, and so on. Objection: see 1st item.
• Combine NN with other known preimage-searching methods, like SAT solvers. Objection: NNs may not provide any advantage over those, wherever into the "chain" NNs are inserted (if so, it would be useful to prove the statements about the absence of such advantage). Since SAT solvers actually apply machine learning approaches, this one is probably implemented by now.
• Train the ensembles of NNs, then combine their outputs. Objection: if NNs predict different messages with partial hash matching, there is no "averaging" to increase the accuracy.
• Train NN to predict the message for which not only the final hash matches the input one, but some bits of intermediate states match the respective bits of such states at the calculation of the true hash. Objection: different states transform to the same hash.
• Generate training samples from the messages that satisfy some constraints, maybe changing these constraints with time, so that NN learns to invert the dependence of CHF on different parts of the message gradually. Objection: NN may not converge, it will learn at first to predict the beginning and not the end, then to predict the end and not the beginning, then again etc.
• Apply different fuzzy ops for different bits of the state, make them depend on the index of the round etc., to distinguish previous states leading to the same current state. Objection: inverse function may become more complex, not simpler.
• Make input hashes and messages they're obtained from more fuzzy, so that their bits aren't only 0/1. Objection: tried on NNs described here, it does not improve training or its results.
• Abandon this approach completely and do not waste time on it. . .
• ???
Addendum
Before actual results for CHFs, we show that a single ADD op as we defined it already presents certain difficulty to NN. 0 "CHF": ADD. The input to NN is 32-bit string, and NN learns to predict such 64-bit string that the sum of its two 32-bit halves is the input. Mask: full, all "hash" bits.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 1024 samples divided into batches of 64 samples.
Loss (L 1 ) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random Miss frequencies per bit
Misses for 1024 predicted messages: Average = 0.528, Min = 0, Max = 2.
Misses for 1024 random messages: Average = 15.944, Min = 6, Max = 25. When NN finds two summands with exactly the given sum in only half of all tests, its ability to invert much more sophisticated CHFs, designed specially to "cover footprints", seems questionable.
The histogram of miss frequencies is typical in that it has some bits with "insurmountable" uncertainty for NN, despite of 100% accuracy for the rest of the bits.
SHA1
This CHF along with MD5 and SHA2 follows Merkle-Damgård construction ( [16, 5.2] ) and uses ADD op, which appears to be the most difficult for our NNs to invert. Increasing the number of layers (towards "deep" learning) and cells per layer does not improve these results much, same if we cut input to only the first 32 bits of hash that can change after 1st round. Another training of the 4-layer NN ends with similar characteristics and distributions, including miss frequencies per bit:
Miss frequencies per bit (2) For a comparison we once provide these frequencies for randomly generated messages:
Miss frequencies per bit for Random 2 As we turn to 2-round SHA1, the accuracy expectably deteriorates. Adding push-from-1 2 transformation to XOR op, -that is, aXOR b = 3r 2 −2r 3 , where r = aXORb, -slightly speeds up NN learning. However, if we push ADD in a similar way, the learning worsens. 
MD5
10 Surprisingly, the 1st round of MD5 is tougher for NN than that of SHA1. 
SHA3/Keccak
There is no ADD op in this CHF, only NOT, AND, XOR. It is based on a sponge construction ( [4] ). The state size is 1600 bits, by default the hash size is 256 bits (note that Keccak's authors at [39] mention, regarding preimage and collision solutions, that "smaller versions are harder to break . . . they offer much less degrees of freedom").
[0; 1]-fuzbits and (−1; 1]-fuzbits produce the results on a par with each other, so we present only the latter-based trainings.
16
When the message is short enough, the inversion of a single (1st) round looks promising. CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 1 round, 64-bit message. Mask: full. , and there's the third group, which is "between". This foreshadows the problem increasing rapidly as the number of rounds grow, for the uncertainty will "propagate" to other bits.
18
That obstacle in the form of lower accuracy bound depends not only on message length, but on rate and capacity of Keccak transformation too.
CHF: Keccak-1600-128, 1 round, 256-bit message (4 lanes Similarly to Res. 18 and 20, NN initially delays before it starts to seemingly increase the accuracy: up to 8-9th epoch there are no signs of the forthcoming "success". This behaviour is known to raise expectations, -maybe we should "wait a little longer and see how NN makes it", though the asymptote of accuracy is still positive. In other words, we would like to be sure that NN from Res. 19 doesn't just need more time.
When the mask is 0-31 bits (first double word of the hash), this NN after 64 epochs is able to match 20 bits of the hash in average, while for random messages it's 16 bits, and the loss remains quite close to 16 for the first 12-13 epochs. 
Ancillary files
The ancillary files to this paper contain the Python implementation of the fuzbit-string CHFs calculation, NumPy-and backend-based, and the NN training to invert few rounds of these CHFs, so that the results presented here can be reproduced, verified, and extended easily if needed. 
